Matt Snell could not believe such stupidity was possible.
Seventeen and a half points, including two for the fullback and halfback advantages the Baltimore Colts supposedly had over the New York Jets? There was no way, Snell deducted, that the 1968 National Football League champions were better than the 1968 American Football League champions, especially in the running game. Snell, a former Ohio State teammate of Colts halfback Tom Matte, knew he and Emerson Boozer formed a better rushing duo than Matte and Jerry Hill. Jimmy "The Greek" Snyder's spread of 17.5 points for Super Bowl III was ludicrous.
Snell, the Jets fullback, benefited from Boozer's calming nature in the days leading up to that Super Bowl in Miami, where the two shared a room at the team hotel. Boozer, the halfback, had to help Snell manage his emotions. Snell knew, and Boozer recognized, the Colts would not be able stop the Jets' rushing attack. In particular, Baltimore would have no answers for New York's bread-and-butter play — the same play that had worked against every opponent in 1968.
Now Snell and Boozer both have "19 Straight" engraved on the inside of their Super Bowl rings.
SN THROWBACK: Jets stun Colts in Super Bowl III
Because the Jets' monumental, 16-7 win over the Colts in January 1969 literally saved what was then the AFL, and because one play was such a staple of New York's offense, it’s not a stretch to say that "19 Straight" helped shape American professional football.
Without the power run to the left, the Jets might not have handled the Colts the way they did at the Orange Bowl. Had New York lost to Baltimore, the AFL might have folded, and the 1970 merger that formed the NFL we recognize today might not have occurred.
"The first two Super Bowls were not competitive," Bob Talamini, the left guard for those Jets, told Sporting News, referring to the Packers' domination of the Chiefs and Raiders, respectively, in Super Bowls I and II. "The discussion was we couldn't beat them; we just gotta make it competitive enough so we’ll have (a Super Bowl) again. Because if it’s not a competitive enough game, we won’t have it anymore."
The aforementioned sentiments regarding the Jets' chances in Super Bowl III were widespread. Snyder, who called the Colts "the greatest defensive team in football history," was far from alone in his assertion that the team from the NFL, the superior league in terms of financial support and player experience, would easily trump the challenger from the AFL. Detroit Free Press columnist Joe Falls predicted the Colts would win 270-0. Jets beat reporter George Usher of Newsday predicted "the Colts will most likely cut off the (Jets') running game as quickly and as efficiently as a guillotine."
Likewise, within the New York organization, the belief Snell displayed before the game was shared by many.
Of all the Jets' pregame expressions of confidence, quarterback Joe Namath's famous guarantee is romanticized most — and with good reason given the ripple effects of such public arrogance. But, much to the chagrin of New York coach Weeb Ewbank, Namath was only stating publicly what had been said privately. For example, tight end Pete Lammons half-jokingly asked Ewbank to stop showing film of the Colts because Jets players were becoming too confident.
Yes, the Jets knew the Colts' zone defense was vulnerable to Namath's precision passing. But New York also knew its rushing offense, criticized as smaller and younger than Baltimore’s powerful, veteran defense, could control the line of scrimmage and wear down the opponent.
"The Jets were smaller," recalled Bob Lederer, author of Beyond Broadway Joe. “But they were quicker.”
That quickness on the line — combined with Snell running “like a caged bull," as Lederer described it, and the mind games Namath played with the Colts defense — was key for the Jets' offense in Super Bowl III.
Matt Snell (41) follows the lead block of Emerson Boozer (32) on a run play in Super Bowl III. (SN archives)
For New York, "19 Straight" was more of a concept than a play. And considering its success rate, the simplicity of the design is astounding.
The five offensive linemen did have specific blocking assignments, but they were not gap-oriented. The direction of each lineman's block would depend on his opponent's first step. If the defender wanted to slant left, the offensive lineman would take him left. If he wanted to slant right, he would be shoved farther to the right.
Such a chaotic scheme made "19 Straight" difficult for linebackers to diagnose. In the Super Bowl, it also helped the Jets' undersized offensive linemen handle the Colts' monsters up front. In most cases, there was no need to try to overpower a defender.
"'Why do we have to block them one way or the other?'" Talamini recalled New York coaches asking. "'They may be stunting into right where we’re going.' … Which was kind of ingenious. It wasn't brain surgery, but it was like, 'OK, wherever that guy goes, you take him; you don’t really care where he goes.' And when a defensive lineman has to take a side, he's going to take the wrong side wherever he goes. Wherever he goes, we’re going to take him that way.
"That’s pretty tough to defend. It was difficult for most defensive people, because they usually are looking for something fixed."
The flanker and the split end (and sometimes the tight end) each would run downfield in an attempt to draw defensive backs and linebackers away from the line of scrimmage because, as Talamini explained, the difficulty of getting those second- and third-level defenders out of the equation was the biggest problem with the play design.
"You might get that defensive lineman running the wrong way," he said. "But the linebackers, nobody can get to them."
The halfback, usually Boozer, would sprint to the left edge of the line and block the first defender he encountered — almost always the weak-side linebacker.
The fullback, usually Snell, would then engage in what Talamini called pick-a-hole: "He might go inside; he might go outside. It puts more pressure on the back only because he has to read things pretty quickly."
That was not a problem for Snell, who rushed for 747 yards in the 1968 regular season before he set what was then a Super Bowl record with 121 yards on 30 carries against Baltimore.
Snell (6-2, 220 pounds) was considered a bruising fullback in his day, and given the superb lead-blocking of Boozer and substitute halfback Bill Mathis, the strong work of the offensive line and the astute play designs, he met little resistance against the Colts.
"No one guy could take him down, and that's not an exaggeration,” Lederer said of Snell in the Super Bowl. "It took two, sometimes three guys to get him down. He had the game of his life that day."
The Jets ran the ball 43 times against the Colts. Of those runs, 22 went to the left. Based on a study of the NBC broadcast of Super Bowl III, SN concludes New York ran "19 Straight" — or a nearly identical concept — 12 times against Baltimore, all with Snell carrying the ball.
When the Jets ran it on the first series of the game, the collision between Snell and Rick Volk left the All-Pro Colts safety with a concussion.
"I remember coming out of the pileup and saying, 'These guys aren’t so tough,'" Snell is quoted as saying in Lederer's book.
New York ran "19 Straight" three times in a row during its first drive of the second quarter, which turned out to be a pivotal possession. Fresh off an interception of Baltimore QB Earl Morrall in the end zone, the Jets ended a 12-play, 80-yard drive with a four-yard Snell touchdown on, yes, "19 Straight." Later, holding a 13-0 lead, they ran it on four of the first eight plays of the fourth quarter as they put the game on ice.
Below are some animations of the Jets' "19 Straight" plays in Super Bowl III — a few in the second quarter and one in the fourth. Despite the differences in the routes traveled by certain players, all are variations of the same play.
Naturally, for a play designed to run off the left edge, the left tackle was a key player. That’s why then-Colts center Bill Curry has been quoted as saying, “Winston Hill was probably the most valuable player" of Super Bowl III. (Namath, of course, was named Super Bowl MVP, though many think Snell was most deserving of the award.)
Hill went into the game worried about Colts defensive end Ordell Braase. Hill was drafted by Baltimore in 1963, but he entered Colts training camp that year with little-to-no chance to make the roster. Braase embarrassed Hill so bad in practices that the offensive tackle almost quit football.
Ironically, it was Colts coach Don Shula who suggested Hill try his luck in New York. In fact, Hill was one of four ex-Baltimore players who contributed to the Jets' win in Super Bowl III, with Hill’s impact being by far the greatest.
"Winston Hill obliterated Braase," Lederer said. "(Hill) literally drove him out of the game. They put Roy Hilton in to replace him in the second half."
Lederer also credits Talamini's work on the left side of the line as key in sealing off the Colts' defense. Talamini, whose one season with the Jets after seven years in Houston was his last as a pro football player, was the veteran (30 years old) of the young offensive line.
Right guard Randy Rasmussen, who grew up a Colts fan, had a personal concern about blocking Baltimore defensive tackle Billy Ray Smith. But, as Lederer writes in his book, “Randy shocked the football world (and maybe himself) by dominating his childhood hero."
Dave Herman, a guard who was moved to right tackle before the game, has been called the unsung hero of Super Bowl III. The 6-1, 255-pound Herman's work against 6-7, 275-pound Colts defensive end Bubba Smith is what Lederer calls one of the top one-on-one performances in Super Bowl history.
As for center John Schmitt, the physical tests he passed against the Colts were accompanied by mental challenges. The mind games he and Namath played with the Baltimore defense are what Lederer considers the key to the success of New York’s running game in Super Bowl III.
An excerpt from Lederer’s book best explains the "play" that became known as "Check with Me":
"Don Shula, after replacing Weeb Ewbank as coach of the Colts early in 1963, retained Ewbank’s offensive and defensive systems. In other words, the “hot colors,” offensive formations/play calls and numbers associated with each play, went largely unchanged. Shula did reverse the direction of offensive plays, so in Baltimore a running play headed to the right, while the same call on the Jets would veer to the left. For six regular seasons, the Jets and Colts competed in separate leagues and never played each other, so Shula’s decision had no impact.
"It didn't take long once Super Bowl III started for Weeb Ewbank and offensive assistant Clive Rush to recognize that the Jets’ and Colts’ offensive plays and signals were identical, only designed to head in the opposite direction. That insight, according to Schmitt, was a key reason why the Jets’ offense and Namath implemented 'Check with Me.' Namath understood the Colts’ defense superbly from game film and could accurately read it at the line of scrimmage.
"Using 'Check with Me,' Joe came to the line without a play call, analyzed where Baltimore’s defense was loading up, made his play decision, and barked out his play call. Namath’s first signals deliberately had the active Colts safety and linebacker shifting in one direction — and once they did, Joe immediately changed his play call to one heading in the opposite direction. For a professional player, even one or two steps in the wrong direction can take them out of the play.
"The Colts appeared to sense but did not react to the similarity of the Jets’ offense system. Namath began using the Colts’ indecisiveness against them. ‘The Colts knew our check-off colors — Green, Gray, and Gold; Blue, Black, and Brown; or Red, White, and Blue,' said Schmitt. 'They would hear Joe check off, I would yell out a play to the offensive line (like Blue, Blue, P36T), the Colts would shift in a direction, and Joe would immediately audible, bark out Green P35T — the same play he originally called, but in the opposite direction, and I’d snap the ball. We did it over and over, and the Colts’ frustration grew. They never figured out why they were always a step behind us. By the third quarter, we knew we had the game. The Colts started fighting each other.'"
Lederer said Snell — and everybody else on the Jets' offense — had no idea what Namath and Schmitt were doing to the Colts that day. In fact, Lederer said Snell was shocked to hear about it almost 50 years later: "That’s what Joe did?"
Talamini confirmed to SN that he had no knowledge of “Check with Me” prior to the revelation in Lederer’s book. The left guard had other things to worry about on the field in Miami.
"When you're an offensive lineman, you just come out of the huddle. You don’t know what’s gonna happen, what colors (Namath) called. I didn't hear that dialogue,” Talamini said. "You have to be very focused about what’s going on in front of you, because …
"Nowadays, they can’t kill you. In our days, they could kill you pretty quick, because it wasn't illegal to grab facemasks or head rake or put his hand underneath your facemask and try to take the head with you and all that stuff. And I’m not trying to make it dramatic, but it was different. When you went up there, this guy across from you could do anything he wanted to you.”
Matt Snell (41) rushes to the end zone for the Jets' only touchdown of Super Bowl III, a four-yard sprint to the left edge in the second quarter. (SN archives)
Talamini said “19 Straight" was the Jets' favorite play simply because Snell and Boozer were so good. He told Lederer he never in his career saw two running backs who could block as well as those guys did.
On the Friday before the Super Bowl, presumably long after Boozer had calmed Snell's nerves regarding Snyder's point spread, the two Jets backs made a pact while sitting in their hotel room.
"We'd go on the field Sunday," Snell is quoted as saying in Lederer’s book, "and whoever's running play was working, the other would block like they'd never done before."
So Boozer, who carried the ball 10 times for just 19 yards, blocked like he had never done before in Super Bowl III. Fittingly, it was Boozer's seal of the left edge that sprung Snell to his touchdown run in the second quarter.
New York's running game, of course, was not the only reason the team upset Baltimore. Namath, who Lederer said played the "most professionally quarterbacked game he ever ran," picked apart the Colts’ defense with short passes to the right and, after Baltimore had shifted its zone coverage, timely deep shots to George Sauer down the left sideline.
The Jets also forced five turnovers and kept the Colts off the scoreboard until late in the fourth quarter. Many credit New York's defense for the win considering the offense scored just 16 points, an amount many, including the Jets themselves, assumed would not be enough. New York's defense had told its offense it could hold Baltimore to 17 points, so the Jets needed to score at least that many to win.
But, Lederer said, "You have to understand the context: The Jets wanted to eat the clock and keep the Baltimore defense on the field."
With that said, time of possession could be considered the key stat of Super Bowl III. New York easily won that battle, 36:10 to 23:50.
Without one simple, go-to power running play, maybe the Jets would not have done exactly what they wanted to do — what they knew they would be able to do — against the Colts. Maybe New York would not have shocked Baltimore. Maybe the AFL would have succumbed to the NFL.
Maybe the modern construct of pro football in America would not exist.